Photon active interrogation offers solutions to many of the challenges with preventing the proliferation of concealed special nuclear material. A pulse shape discrimination capable organic scintillator based detection approach coupled with the use of a conventional linac offers a cost-effective active interrogation technique. However, there are challenges with mitigating non-target emitted signals. In this investigation, active background has been reduced through shielding and detector placement, and photoneutrons have been detected over the active background. Due to pulse pileup, many neutrons are missed through traditional pulse shape discrimination methods, demonstrating the need for implementation of new advanced techniques.
INTRODUCTION
Preventing the proliferation of special nuclear materials (SNM) is a difficult problem due to the ease of concealment and the small quantities of materials that could be damaging. Highly enriched uranium (HEU) is arguably the most accessible weapons usable material because hundreds of tons exist worldwide that could be fabricated into a weapon. Preventing the proliferation of HEU is especially challenging because it emits primarily low-energy photons and very few neutrons. These emissions can be easily attenuated with shielding to avoid detection. A more significant signal can be induced in the material through active interrogation. A variety of interrogating particles can be used, but one readily available option is high-energy photons. Photons with energy greater than the photonuclear threshold of the material of interest can induce photonuclear reactions. Very few materials can undergo photonuclear reactions, and detection of the signatures produced by these reactions is a strong signal of possible SNM presence.
Large amounts of high-energy bremsstrahlung photons can be produced by electron linear accelerators (linac) 1 . The pulsed structure of the emitted photons allows for detection of prompt neutrons, and the high-energy photons can penetrate shielding materials to induce photonuclear reactions in the target material. To study this linac based method for material detection a Varian 9-MV 2 , 1-kW, linear accelerator has been installed at the University of Michigan. The accelerator contains a permanent conversion target that produces bremsstrahlung radiation from the incident electrons. This conversion yields an X-ray energy spectrum with a portion of the photons greater than the photonuclear threshold for materials of interest. By inducing photonuclear reactions, a detectable signal of fast neutrons will be produced yielding a positive confirmation of nuclear material presence. With the development of organic scintillator detection methods, this widely available photon source offers a cost effective means to detect hidden special nuclear material.
The linac photon source offers a reduction in equipment and maintenance costs over Rhodotrons currently used in some active interrogation systems 3 . The pulsed nature of this source, along with the pulse shape discrimination (PSD) capabilities and fast time-scale operation of organic scintillators, allows for detection of prompt neutrons. Prompt neutron detection yields a stronger signal than delayed neutron signatures from SNM. The challenges of this detection environment include isolating the nuclear material fast neutron emissions from interrogating photons and active background signals, and detecting a large flux of particles on a short time scale. These photons are either scattered into the detector by the interrogation target or surrounding material, or originate from the accelerator itself. Traditional PSD 4 performance in this detection environment is under investigation, in conjunction with the development of a new neural network based approach for PSD along with pulse recovery 5 .
DETECTION METHOD
To separate the neutron signal from these photons, a PSD-capable 5.08 cm Ø x 5.08 cm trans-stilbene organic scintillator was chosen as the detector because it has a high neutron detection efficiency and excellent PSD. This PSD capability allows the detector to be sensitive to both photons and fast neutrons. Stilbene also produces very short pulses, limiting the effects of dead-time caused by the time scale of an accelerator pulse.
The PSD method used is the charge integration technique, which utilizes the ratio between the "tail integral" and "total integral" of a pulse (shown in FIGURE 1 (a)) to identify the pulse as either a neutron or photon. Scintillation light induced by an incident neutron in the detector decays more slowly than that induced by a photon. This decay difference leads to a larger ratio of the tail integral over the total integral for neutron pulses. FIGURE 1 (b) shows how this difference can be used to discriminate the two particles. An issue that can arise in high-count rate environments is that a second pulse arriving in the tail integral of the first pulse (a "double pulse") can artificially increase the tail-to-total ratio of the pulse, possibly falsely interpreting it as a neutron pulse 6 . The use of a linac for this study introduces many source photons on a short time scale, and yields a high probability of double pulse detection. Using a short time for recording each pulse can mitigate these effects, and in the measurements taken for this study each triggered pulse records 144 ns of detector signal.
ACTIVE BACKGROUND MITIGATION
Source photons and photons either emitted or scattered from the interrogation target must be shielded from the detector as well as possible to reduce the probability of double pulse detection. By reducing the detection of these double pulses, we increase the accuracy of neutron detection, allowing for more accurate SNM identification. Neutrons emitted from the laboratory surroundings also cloud the accuracy of SNM identification, and must be shielded along with source photons. Much of this active background suppression is achieved in conjunction with operational safety considerations, and minimal active background flux points can also be identified. Dose rates resulting from photons and neutrons were simulated with MCNPX 7 , and results are shown in FIGURE 2. The linac is located in the lower left corner of the geometry shown, with the beam travelling to the right. Personnel can occupy the area of the lab above the fence-line, with controls located at the asterisked dose rate label. Interrogation targets are placed in the beamline below the fence-line, with detectors off-axis. Photon and neutron dose is greatly reduced by shielding designed for safety, and additional mitigation is considered for experimental accuracy.
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The main sources of non-interrogation target produced neutrons are the beam collimator and beamstop, which bookend the beamline experimental area. These lead components, which are well-known sources of neutrons from were also shielded with borated polyethylene to reduce neutron emission. To minimize the contribution of these active background neutrons, measurements were performed with a fast-neutron sensitive 3 He module at locations along the length of the beamline, 50 cm from the beam center. This 3 He panel is coated with cadmium to capture incoming thermal neutrons below 0.5 eV and 10 B to capture many thermal and epithermal neutrons. Lead targets were placed in the beam at the minimal active background neutron location. The minimum active background neutron contribution is shown in FIGURE 3 at 10.5 m from the photon source at the linac conversion target. At this point, active background contribution is limited to 39% and 29% of the overall 050015-3 signal detected from the interrogated 1000 cm 3 and 2000 cm 3 lead targets, respectively. Since this thermal neutron shielded 3 He detector is primarily sensitive to fast neutrons these experiments can inform the expected increase in neutron count rate due to target presence measured with stilbene, which is only sensitive to neutrons above approximately 0.5 MeV.
This configuration of the laboratory is used for experiments with a stilbene detector, with the added shielding of four inch thick lead in all directions for additional photon mitigation.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
As an initial test of PSD performance with an organic scintillator in this interrogation environment, lead and tungsten targets were interrogated with the lead shielded detector 1.7 m off-axis from the target. These targets were chosen for their photonuclear cross sections. Both materials have effective photonuclear thresholds near 8 MeV, with lead cross sections peaking at about 600 mb and tungsten at about 400 mb, both near 13 MeV 8 . They act as a practical experimental surrogate for SNM. To pre-emptively eliminate double pulses, any pulse with a signal increase greater than 6% of the original pulse height was classified as a double pulse and discarded. Pulses that exceeded the dynamic range maximum were also discarded. PSD was then performed on the cleaned pulses. ) and (c) demonstrates the large number of instances double pulses, which are generally observed as pulses exhibiting a ratio outside of the expected neutron and photon "clouds," or ranges of tail-to-total integrals. Double pulse cleaning eliminates some of the pulses above the discrimination line, but many remain. Some pulses recorded here have also been misclassified as neutrons when they are truly small double pulses. Conversely, pulses classified as double pulses and discarded may truly be neutrons. Pulses have also been cleaned out when the signal either clips, or does not return to baseline likely due to a partial double pulse. The calculated results of these experiments are shown in Table 1 . The discarded pulse fraction remains very large for all experiments, demonstrating the need for pulse recovery techniques. With the targets in the beamline a modest increase in neutron count rate is observed. This increase over the active background is much lower than the increase from a target present expected from the previously discussed 3 He experiments. While not yet providing expected neutron count rates, these stilbene measurements demonstrate the potential merits of this active interrogation signature detection method, which will be improved in the future with a neural network based PSD and pulse recovery approach.
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CONCLUSIONS
Using PSD-capable organic scintillators to detect neutrons in a high-energy, high-flux photon environment offers a cost-effective means to detect shielded special nuclear material. However, there are many challenges that must be overcome before this method can be implemented. This work has demonstrated that laboratory conditions can be tailored to allow for experiments to demonstrate this technology with SNM-surrogate interrogation targets. These experiments have shown that these targets contribute a modest increase in detected neutrons over the active background, with aggressive double pulse cleaning. The magnitude of this increase compared to the measured increase with a 3 He module demonstrates the need for advanced PSD and pulse processing methods. An indevelopment neural network based pulse processing algorithm will allow for more efficient PSD and recovery of information from both pulses in a double pulse event, which are currently both discarded. With the implementation of this approach we hope to demonstrate the benefits of this organic scintillator based photon active interrogation technique for hidden SNM detection.
